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FY 1974 REPORT

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Secretary of Defense

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## B. THE THREAT

As is customary in the Annual Report of the Defense Department, we present a summary of significant elements and changes in the military threats faced by the U. S. Admiral Moorer will discuss the threat in greater detail.


### The Soviet Threat

#### 1. The Soviet Strategic Nuclear Threat

The primary potential threat to the United States remains the Soviet Union's land-based and submarine-based ballistic missiles and long-range bomber aircraft. During the past decade, the Soviets have engaged in a vigorous and costly buildup of their forces for intercontinental attack. <sup>the Soviets</sup> They are currently engaged in an extensive development and testing program involving several new, improved or modified strategic weapons systems.



The number of operational ICBM launchers remains at the same number reported last year — 1527 — plus about 100 ICBM launchers at test and training sites. Deployment programs for those ICBMs deployed since 1964, i.e., the SS-9, SS-11 and SS-13, appear to have been completed, but the construction of 91 new silos continues.



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[REDACTED] The smaller silos are expected to be completed by the middle of this year and the larger silos a year later. While it is still too early to know exactly what ICBMs are to be deployed in these silos, we believe that initially the SS-11 [REDACTED] will be deployed in the new smaller silos, and that the [REDACTED] (SS-9 follow-on) ICBM will be deployed in the larger silos being constructed in the SS-9 missile complexes. Increased survivability is probably a major objective of the new silo construction.

[REDACTED]  
These modifications have progressed to an improved version of the SS-11 employing three reentry vehicles (MRV) of up to [REDACTED]


[REDACTED] Although Soviet MRVs could be operationally deployed now, we do not expect the Soviets to achieve the more sophisticated MIRV capability before [REDACTED]

Qualitative upgrading of the Soviet SLBM force appears on the horizon with the testing of a new missile, the SS-N-8, which has more than three times the range and somewhat better accuracy than the present missile -- the SS-N-6 -- carried by the YANKEE class ballistic missile submarine. The platform for this bigger missile appears to be a 12-tube modification of the YANKEE called the DELTA-class. [Two DELTAs have been launched thus far] the [first unit] should soon become operational.

[The introduction of the DELTA class submarine appears to]

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 Although YANKEE deployments in 1972 were about the same as in 1971, there seems little doubt that out-of-area operations by the YANKEE and the DELTA boats will increase in number over the next several years. Since 1971, Y-Class submarines have been deployed in both the Atlantic and the Pacific within strike range of the U.S.

[Additional missile tubes on the older H and G-Class submarines give the Soviets a total of about 600 launchers in the operational inventory.]

The Soviet intercontinental heavy bomber force remains, as it has for the last few years, at approximately 195 aircraft, including about 50 tankers and reconnaissance aircraft. Some of these bombers are equipped to carry air-to-surface missiles (ASMs).


[Most heavy bombers probably would be targeted against the U.S. Some of the BEAR ASM carriers, however, may also be assigned contingency anti-naval missions.]

The Soviets have continued test flying BACKFIRE, their new supersonic swing-wing bomber, which is probably now in

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
series production. There is still uncertainty about the primary mission of BACKFIRE; the weight of evidence favors the view that it is best suited for peripheral attack but an intercontinental capability still cannot be ruled out. Assignment to operational units could begin late this year.



2. Soviet Strategic Defensive Forces

The only deployed ABM system contains some 64 launchers around Moscow at four operational complexes. Continued construction in the vicinity of the Moscow ABM system could be for additional launchers, permitted under the ABM Treaty, [or for command and control and communications.]

A follow-on, long-range ABM system is believed to be under development



R&D on this system as well as on other new ABM components will almost certainly continue.

The Soviets have made and continue to make a major commitment to the air defense of the Soviet Union. Forces totally committed to this mission included about 3,000 interceptor aircraft and about 10,000 surface-to-air missile (SAM) launchers at the

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end of 1972. Although these forces continue to improve slowly and steadily, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] during the past year.

They have probably completed a limited deployment of about airborne warning and control (AWAC) aircraft. [REDACTED]

Modern fighters are also being deployed, and older type aircraft are being withdrawn from the inventory. A new high speed Soviet fighter aircraft, FOXBAT, has entered the air defense inventory. [REDACTED] This aircraft has a good capability for intercept at high altitudes, but its capabilities at low altitudes are limited. Deployments of the SA-3 and SA-5 SAM systems are continuing at a slow pace.

Soviet anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capabilities presently do not represent a significant threat to the U.S.-ballistic missile submarine fleet. However, ASW enjoys high priority in Soviet naval planning, and substantial resources are being devoted to ASW research and development.

### ~~3. Soviet Theater Nuclear Capabilities~~

At the theater nuclear level, the Soviets have deployed over the years several nuclear delivery systems, the most significant being about 550-600 medium and intermediate range

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## THE FY 1974 PROGRAM AND FORCES

The major forces and weapon system acquisition programs supported by the FY 1974 Defense Budget are discussed in this chapter of the report under two broad headings -- Strategic Forces and General Purpose and Mobility Forces.

### A. STRATEGIC FORCES

The SAL Agreements limit the deployment of ICBM and SLBM launchers and ABM defenses, but no limitations are included for strategic bombers, cruise missiles and air defenses. Except for certain new types of ABM defense systems and ICBM silo size restrictions, there are no limitations on qualitative improvements in the forces -- that is on modernization. Indeed, the Agreements anticipate that both parties will continue to modernize their forces. As Admiral Moorer will describe for you in his presentation, the Soviet Union, within the bounds of the Agreements, is doing so in a most impressive manner.

The United States, on its part, is also continuing its modernization efforts in harmony with both the letter and the spirit of the SAL Agreements. The forces and programs proposed for authorization and funding in FY 1974 fall well within the limitations of those Agreements. In fact, as shown in the following table, [the operational strategic forces planned for end FY 1978 will be lower in almost all categories than the ceilings established or the levels prevailing at mid-1972, when the Agreements were signed.]

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Operational U.S. Strategic Forces  
(end of fiscal year)

|                      | <u>1972</u> | <u>1974</u> | <u>1978</u> | <u>SAL Ceiling 1/</u> |
|----------------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-----------------------|
| ICBMs                | 1054        | 1054        | 1045        | 1054                  |
| SLBMs                | 656         | 656         | 656         | 656                   |
| Strategic Bombers    | 525         | 498         | 427         | ---                   |
| Interceptor Aircraft | 619         | 596         | 546         | ---                   |
| SAMs on Site         | 840         | 756         | 756         | ---                   |
| ABM Defense Areas    | ---         | ---         | 1           | 2                     |

1/ Expires in October 1977

[The drop in ICBMs reflects phaseout of nine of the 54 TITAN II missiles.] The reduction in bombers reflects the phaseout [of four squadrons] of older model B-52s. The reduction in surface-to-air missiles reflects the phaseout of the BOMARC force.

The only significant force change programmed for FY 1974 is a reduction of two B-52D squadrons. The retaliatory force at the end of FY 1974 will include 1,000 MINUTEMAN missiles, 54 TITAN missiles, 425 B-52 aircraft, 73 FB-111 aircraft and 656 POLARIS and POSEIDON missiles carried on 41 nuclear-powered submarines. The strategic defensive forces at end FY 1974 will include 27 squadrons of interceptor aircraft and 48 Nike Hercules missile batteries.

The Strategic Program proposed for FY 1974 is focused primarily on the modernization of the forces. A summary of the funding proposed for strategic weapon system acquisition programs in FY 1974, compared with FY 1973 and FY 1972, is shown in the table on the following page.

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MAJOR STRATEGIC FORCE PROGRAMS

(Dollars in Millions)

|   | <u>FY 1972</u><br><u>Actual</u><br><u>Funding</u> | <u>FY 1973</u><br><u>Planned</u><br><u>Funding</u> | <u>FY 1974</u><br><u>Proposed</u><br><u>Funding</u> |
|---|---|--|---|
| <u>STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE FORCES</u>   |   |  |   |
| Conversion of SSBNs to POSEIDON Configuration, Continued Procurement of POSEIDON Missiles and Associated Effort | 718   | 700  | 498   |
| Development, Procurement and Military Construction Costs of TRIDENT Ballistic Missile Submarine and Missile     | 105   | 795  | 1,712   |
| Development of Strategic Cruise Missile   | --  | 4  | 15  |
| Continued Procurement of MINUTEMAN III and MINUTEMAN Force Modernization (Inc dev costs)                        | 938   | 813  | 777   |
| Development of Advanced Ballistic Re-entry Systems and Technology   | 96  | 95   | 95  |
| B-52D Modifications   | 15  | 47   | 63  |
| Development and Continued Procurement of Short Range Attack Missile (SRAM)                                      | 245   | 203  | 139   |
| Continued Development of Subsonic Cruise Armed Decoy (SCAD)   | 10  | 49   | 72  |
| Continued Development of New Strategic Bomber, B-1  | 370   | 445  | 474   |
| Development and Deployment of Advanced Airborne Command Post (AABNCP)   | --  | 117  | 83  |
| Development of SANGUINE ELF System  | 4   | 9  | 17  |


STRATEGIC DEFENSIVE FORCES

|   |     |     |     |
|---|-----|-----|-----|
| Continued Development and Production of Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) | 139 | 194 | 210 |
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MAJOR STRATEGIC FORCE PROGRAMS (Con't)

(Dollars in Millions)

|  | <u>FY 1972</u><br><u>Actual</u><br><u>Funding</u> | <u>FY 1973</u><br><u>Planned</u><br><u>Funding</u> | <u>FY 1974</u><br><u>Proposed</u><br><u>Funding</u> |
|--|---|--|---|
|  |   |  |   |
| SLBM Phased Array Radar Warning System   | --  | 7  | 31  |
| Continued Deployment of SAFEGUARD  | 996   | 600  | 402   |
| Development of Site Defense  | 60  | 101  | 170   |
| Identification and Development of Advanced Ballistic Missile Defense Technology    | 96  | 93   | 100   |
| Civil Defense  | 78  | 84   | 89  |

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1. Strategic Offensive Forces

The strategic offensive forces program includes both near-term and long-term modernization efforts. Examples of the ongoing, near-term modernization programs are MINUTEMAN III and POSEIDON. The major long-term modernization programs are the TRIDENT submarine and missile and the B-1 strategic bomber.

Sea-Based Strategic Missile Systems

The near-term modernization of the sea-based strategic missile forces is being accomplished through the POSEIDON program. The \$498 million requested for this program in the FY 1974 Budget includes \$237 million for the last five of the 31 submarine conversions planned (including post-delivery and outfitting costs), and about \$9 million of advanced procurement funding required for the last submarine tender conversion programmed in FY 1974. This amount will complete funding of the submarine conversion program except for outfitting and post delivery costs. Another \$252 million has been requested for procurement of [92] POSEIDON missiles, initial spares and long leadtime items for the final increment of [41] missiles to be procured in FY 1975. Of the 26 submarine conversions funded through FY 1973, 13 have been completed and deployed, 8 are undergoing conversion, 4 have been completed but not yet deployed, and 1 will begin conversion prior to the end of FY 1973. All 31 conversions are expected to be completed by November 1975.

To provide for the longer term modernization of the sea-based strategic missile forces, the TRIDENT program is being pursued. The

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TRIDENT program is designed to ensure the maintenance of an effective sea-based strategic missile force in the future, to provide a significant hedge against the possibility of Soviet technological breakthrough, and to establish an orderly replacement program for POLARIS submarines.

The TRIDENT submarine will provide a launch platform incorporating the latest submarine survivability features when it becomes operational in 1978. The TRIDENT I missile, when carrying an average POSEIDON-type payload, will have a range of 4,000 nautical miles; with a smaller payload, its range would be extended

[REDACTED] The effectiveness of the SSBN force can be further improved by the development and deployment of the TRIDENT II missile.

A total of \$1,712 million has been requested in FY 1974 to complete the program as now planned: \$658 million for Research and Development; \$872 million for procurement; and \$182 million for military construction work on the TRIDENT refit complex and other support facilities. The procurement request includes \$587 million for the first TRIDENT submarine. This amount, together with FY 1973 funds of \$194 million, will finance its currently estimated total cost of \$781 million. The FY 1974 request also includes \$281 million of advance procurement funds for the next six TRIDENT ships and about \$5 million for technical support of missile facilities.

The \$15 million requested for the strategic cruise missile is for the conduct of preliminary design studies. The Soviet Union has had an extensive program in this area and has a wide variety of


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cruise missiles. Cruise missiles are not covered by the Interim Agreement, and the United States should give some attention to this particular area of technology, for both the strategic and the tactical roles.

Intercontinental Ballistic Missile Systems

For the near term modernization of the ICBM forces, \$777 million has been included in the FY 1974 Budget for the MINUTEMAN program. About \$394 million is needed for procurement of 136 MINUTEMAN III missiles, the final buy to complete the currently planned force objective of 550 missiles. To protect the option to deploy more than 550 MINUTEMAN IIIs, if that should prove necessary in the future, another \$23 million has been requested for long leadtime items. About \$9 million is included for MINUTEMAN II improvements. The remaining \$351 million is required primarily to continue work on the MINUTEMAN silo upgrading program and the Command Data Buffer System.



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The MINUTEMAN force, today, is highly survivable, but provision must be made now to hedge against a major improvement in the capabilities of Soviet forces to attack hard targets. In addition, the targeting flexibility of the force needs to be improved. These objectives are being met by the silo upgrading program and the installation of the Command Data Buffer System. The silo upgrading program is designed to provide improved protection against nuclear blast and radiation effects. The Command Data Buffer system will provide rapid retargeting of MINUTEMAN III from the launch control centers, which will enhance the flexibility of force employment. The silo upgrading program is coordinated with the MINUTEMAN III conversion at one base, and with the installation of a Command Data Buffer system at all MINUTEMAN III bases, so that all three programs can be completed in the most efficient manner.

Another important developmental effort that is continuing for the strategic offensive forces is the Advanced Ballistic Re-entry System (ABRES) program, for which \$95 million is requested in the FY 1974 Budget. This program supports investigations of several types of improved re-entry systems.

#### Strategic Bomber Systems

Funds are provided in the FY 1974 Budget for three important programs needed for the near-term modernization of the bomber forces. The first of these is a new program -- structural modifications to extend the service life of 80 B-52D aircraft. Recent inspections of the B-52D fleet have revealed fatigue-induced structural weaknesses

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which will require extensive structural modifications if the aircraft are to be kept in operation beyond mid-1975. The B-52G and H aircraft are not affected by this problem since they were manufactured under a different process. Without the B-52Ds, the conventional bombing capabilities of the B-52 force can be maintained only at the expense of its strategic role. Modification of 80 B-52Ds is scheduled to start in FY 1973, at a total cost of \$197 million. Around \$47 million would be made available in FY 1973, \$13 million by reprogramming, and another \$63 million has been requested in FY 1974 for this program. Most of the remaining funds would be provided in FY 1975, [and modification of the 80 aircraft is expected to be completed by the end of FY 1976.]

The second program is the continued acquisition of the Short Range Attack Missile (SRAM), which would be used by strategic bombers to attack terminal defenses as well as primary targets. The missile uses a solid fuel engine to attain supersonic speeds along the selected flight profile, and it can be launched at high or low altitude. Having successfully demonstrated its performance capabilities, SRAM has been in production for over two years. The FY 1974 Budget provides \$139 million for procurement of 454 missiles. This number, together with missiles procured previously, will provide a total of 1,500 missiles, which will equip a force of 17 B-52 G/H and 4 FB-111 squadrons. The budget also includes \$47 million to modify B-52 aircraft to carry SRAM. All units of B-52 G/H and FB-111 aircraft

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are now scheduled to be equipped with this new missile by [the second quarter of FY 1976.]

The third near-term modernization program is the Subsonic Cruise Armed Decoy (SCAD), which is designed to aid bombers in countering projected improvements in Soviet area air defenses in the late 1970's. [SCAD is expected to have a range of 500-1200 nautical miles, depending upon its configuration.] It is being designed to simulate the radar characteristics of a B-52, thereby presenting many additional incoming objects that the Soviets must counter with area defenses. These decoys will provide a very efficient way for the bomber force to saturate and confuse air defenses. SCAD is also being designed with an option to incorporate a warhead and the associated improved guidance and provision for increased range. This would be accomplished with minimum modifications by modular changes.

Competitive development of prototype engines for SCAD is now being conducted by two contractors. Extensive flight testing of the developed system will be accomplished before a production decision is made. The SCAD program is proceeding on a fly-before-buy basis, and the first flight tests are now scheduled for FY 1975. The FY 1974 Budget contains \$72 million to continue development of this new system.

To provide the option for the longer term modernization of the bomber force, \$474 million is included in the FY 1974 Budget to continue engineering development of the B-1 Intercontinental Bomber. Although the B-1 is smaller and lighter than the B-52, it will have

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greater range, speed, and payload capability than the B-52 on a comparable mission. The B-1 is designed for a high degree of survivability from launch to recovery, and for a quick reaction take-off capability, with rapid acceleration to escape nuclear attack. It will have a wide range of altitude and airspeed capabilities, from very low altitude subsonic to high altitude supersonic, as well as the avionics needed to penetrate Soviet defenses and accurately deliver weapons on target. Sufficient space and power will be available for growth in ECM and other penetration capabilities if that should be required by a greater defensive threat.

The B-1 engineering development contract with North American Rockwell is a Cost Plus Incentive Fee contract, with no commitment to produce the aircraft. The B-1 is being developed in such a manner as to minimize concurrency between development and production. After the first flight scheduled in April 1974, there will be a 15-month flight test program involving three flight test aircraft. No production decision on the B-1 will be made until the performance requirements are demonstrated and firm cost data are available.

#### Strategic Command and Control

The credibility of our strategic deterrent depends in part on the existence of a reliable and survivable command and control system. The most critical need, as has been noted often in the past, has been an airborne command post with larger capacity, increased survivability, and greater endurance. The EC-135 aircraft currently used for this purpose are inadequate because they have no automatic

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data processing capability, lack proper communications, are not hardened against the full range of nuclear effects, provide insufficient space for staff, and have no further growth capacity. Accordingly, the decision was made a year ago to develop the necessary equipment and procure new aircraft to serve as the Advanced Airborne Command Post (AABNCP).

The proposed new aircraft is a modified Boeing 747 specially equipped to provide a modernized, highly survivable capability for effective command and control of our strategic forces on a continuous basis before, during, and after any nuclear attack on the United States. The program will be conducted in three phases. In the first phase, EC-135 equipments will be transferred to three 747 aircraft to provide an interim National Emergency Airborne Command Post (NEACP) capability. The second phase involves the development of an Advanced Command, Control and Communications package using one test-bed 747 aircraft, and the installation of this package in three additional 747 aircraft. In the last phase, the three interim NEACP aircraft will be retrofitted with the advanced package, making a total of seven newly equipped 747 AABNCPs.

Funding for two interim NEACP and one test-bed aircraft was approved in FY 1973. The FY 1974 Budget includes \$37 million for continued development of the AABNCP system, \$32 million to procure the fourth (third interim) aircraft, and \$14 million for military construction. Procurement of the last three aircraft is now planned for FY 1976, although procurement of one or more may be proposed

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in FY 1975, depending upon progress in the development program.

Additional capabilities for survivable communications with submerged submarines, beyond those provided by the current TACAMO communication relay aircraft may be needed.

[REDACTED] For this reason, \$17 million has been requested in the FY 1974 Budget to continue development of the SANGUINE Extremely Low Frequency (ELF) system. The development effort over the next three years is expected to determine whether current estimates of cost and environmental compatibility are valid.

## 2. Strategic Defensive Forces

### Air Defense

Planning of the CONUS air defense system has undergone a number of major changes during the last decade. The current objectives are to provide a defense of the U.S. against a small bomber attack, assuming [REDACTED] of strategic warning, and as a minimum a SAM defense of Washington, D. C. Forces which can satisfy these objectives will also be capable of performing peacetime surveillance and identification functions to protect the sovereignty of U.S. air space.

Force readiness has been reduced consistent with the planning assumption [REDACTED] of strategic warning. More specifically, the interceptor alert rate has been reduced [REDACTED] five squadrons of BOMARC missiles have been phased out, and all the

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U.S. Back-Up Interceptor Control (BUIC) Centers, except one, have been placed in semi-active status. This last change permits some savings in operations and maintenance costs while retaining a command and control capability that can be brought back to full operational status with [REDACTED] of strategic warning.

For the long term, a number of research and development efforts are underway which will provide the option to deploy a modernized air defense force in the future. The FY 1974 Budget includes funds for two key systems: The CONUS Over-the-Horizon Backscatter (OTH-B) radar, and the Airborne Warning and Control Systems (AWACS).

The OTH-B program would provide two fixed base radar systems -- one facing east and one facing west -- for the long range detection of aircraft approaching the North American continent. While current systems can detect aircraft targets out to about 200 n.m. if they are at high altitudes, the OTH-B could provide all-altitude surveillance [REDACTED]. The FY 1974 Budget includes \$5.5 million to continue the OTH-B development program.

AWACS is designed to detect, identify and track approaching aircraft, and if they are determined to be hostile, to direct our interceptors against them. A small force of AWACS aircraft could replace the bulk of the existing ground-based aircraft warning and control system, which is quite vulnerable to nuclear attack. AWACS is also designed to perform a variety of functions

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in the tactical air mission, such as surveillance, warning and command and control over the battlefield.

The AWACS consists of an air surveillance radar and the associated data processing and communications equipment, all installed in a modified Boeing 707 aircraft. One of the most important and unique technical features of AWACS will be its capability to detect and track aircraft flying at low altitude, over land as well as water.

The two prototype radars for the AWACS system were flight tested in Boeing 707 aircraft during 1972. Analysis of the test results has been completed, and the radar built by Westinghouse was selected on the basis of superior performance. A system integration demonstration will be conducted to verify that the various components can be successfully integrated into an operationally useful system. Then, the operational capabilities of the complete system, installed in prototype aircraft, will be demonstrated in as realistic an operational environment as possible. The FY 1974 Budget includes \$198 million for continued development and testing of AWACS, plus \$12 million for advanced procurement, making a total of \$210 million for the AWACS program.

Another element of a modernized air defense force is an Improved Manned Interceptor (IMI) to replace current interceptors. Although no funds are included in the FY 1974 Budget for this purpose, we are continuing to examine the feasibility of adapting an aircraft currently under development to perform this mission.

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An IMI would have improved performance characteristics, including a "look-down, shoot-down" capability. In addition, the Army's new SAM-D surface-to-air missile system, now under development for theater air defense, could also be used in a modernized air defense force.

#### Missile Warning and Space Systems

Early warning of an ICBM, SLBM, or Fractional Orbital Bombardment System (FOBS) attack is relayed to the North American Air Defense Command, the National Military Command Center and the Strategic Air Command from a network of radars and satellite-based sensors. For many years the Ballistic Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS) radars, supplemented by the OTH forward scatter radars, were the primary means of obtaining reliable warning of an ICBM attack.

The maturing of satellite-based sensor technology has permitted the successful development and deployment of the early warning satellite system. This system, [REDACTED] [REDACTED] now provides high confidence, virtually immediate warning of a ballistic missile launch from current ballistic missile submarine launch areas, as well as ICBM and FOBS launch areas.

The [REDACTED] satellites are deployed in synchronous equatorial orbits [REDACTED] Data obtained by the satellites is transmitted to ground stations, processed, and sent to SAC, NORAD, NMCS and other users. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

Additional satellites will be launched as required to keep this system fully operational. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

To provide further assurance of timely warning of an SLBM launch against the U.S., it is proposed to augment the current system of coastal radars with two new phased array radars constructed from components of a surplus SAFEGUARD Perimeter Acquisition Radar. A total of \$31 million is included in the FY 1974 Budget for the acquisition of this system, and a reprogramming request for \$7 million in FY 1973 funds has been submitted separately to the interested Congressional Committees.

Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD)

In accordance with the ABM Treaty, which limits each party to one ABM deployment area for the defense of ICBMs, the SAFEGUARD site at Grand Forks will be completed, but work on the second site at Malmstrom has been terminated. Technical progress on SAFEGUARD over the past year has been excellent, and there are no technical problems affecting the plan to proceed with the Grand Forks deployment." The FY 1974 Budget includes \$402 million to continue SAFEGUARD development, test and procurement for the

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Grand Forks site. This site will enable the U.S. to obtain for the first time operational experience with a deployed BMD system.

[ The Treaty also permits each party to deploy an ABM defense for its national capital area, i.e., in the case of the U.S., the National Command Authorities (NCA) in Washington, D.C., but no funds have been included in the FY 1974 Budget for such a deployment. We are continuing, however, to conduct the necessary design, systems engineering and program planning studies for possible deployment of such a site. It could utilize either SAFEGUARD components or a modified version of the more advanced SITE DEFENSE system now under development.

[ The SITE DEFENSE program, for which \$170 million is included in the FY 1974 Budget, is oriented toward developing options for a more effective defense of MINUTEMAN, or other point targets, as a hedge against the need for such a defense in the future. This program is still in the early phases of development. The system will consist of a new phased array radar, a commercial data processor and an improved version of the SPRINT missile used in the SAFEGUARD system. // The proposed program includes studies to define the modifications which would be needed to adapt SITE DEFENSE for defense of the NCA.

[ It is also essential that the United States maintain a vigorous technology development program in the ballistic missile defense area, to prevent technological surprise, to determine the technical feasibility of new BMD concepts, and to assist in the

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design and evaluation of our strategic ballistic missile systems.

Some \$100 million is included in the FY 1974 Budget for this Army exploratory and advanced development program.

U/K Civil Defense

The civil defense program has been reorganized under the new Defense Civil Preparedness Agency which was created in 1972. One new aspect of the civil defense effort is the increased emphasis on total disaster preparedness. All parts of the civil preparedness program are being adapted to emphasize dual-use plans, procedures and preparedness for improved crisis management in both peacetime and attack emergencies, in accordance with Presidential direction.

In March 1972 the Office of Emergency Preparedness, which is responsible for administration of the Disaster Relief Act of 1970, requested DOD to provide advice and guidance to local governments on organization and preparedness to meet the effects of natural disasters. The Department is working toward this as well as the statutory civil defense objectives with a new On-Site Assistance Program. The approach being taken in this program is to have teams of Federal-State personnel make on-site surveys of local civil preparedness situations. The teams analyze local capabilities and needs and develop action plans to meet those needs. Concrete and immediate assistance is provided and plans are developed for long-term readiness assistance which take maximum advantage of Federal, State and local resources. Also stressed is the training of local

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